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ABSTRACT

In this study of race relations, undertaken for the United States Navy, three attribution theories of racism are examined: racism of the individual; racism related to institutional procedures; and racism related to poor management training. Each of these theories corresponds to a specific intervention program which the Navy implemented to reduce racial tension and discrimination. The three programs are described in terms of the models of attribution of discrimination sources. It was concluded that if policy makers attribute problem sources to any one of the three locales, without allowing for changes in the institution itself, then a likely consequence is the generation of inappropriate intervention programs which can produce no change. (Author/RLV)

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Programmatic Consequences of the Causal Attribution of Discrimination in Organizations:

A Case Study.

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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

1979

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1. Introduction.

From September 1974 to March 1979, the Boston University School of Education undertook to conduct a course of research for the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) and to develop a program of training for incoming Navy officers "in the area of Equal Opportunity and Race Relations." Though equal opportunity and race relations are distinctly different subject areas, Navy educational policy makers in 1974 were preoccupied with race relations as a consequence of racial disturbances throughout 1972 that had occured in several Navy vessels and on several Navy and Marine Corps bases. Hence, at the outset of the study, equal opportunity was principally addressed as a program of reform in recruiting, performance rating, and other procedures with a view to ameliorating race relations. Partly for this reason, Navy personnel in educational commands referred to "the Equal Opportunity/Race Relations (EO/RR) area" as a single set of concerns.

To aid in the redesign of training programs in this loosely identified "EO/RR area," the work was to include an evaluation of the existing training programs for Navy officers in equal opportunity and race relations, the identification of "pertinent cultural factors which impinge on the development of Navy equal opportunity/race relations accession point training programs," and the review of "significant completed research pertinent to the development of ... equal opportunity/race relations training programs." These research findings were then to be incorporated in an officer trainee source book and instructor's manual for the course in EO/RR required of entering Navy officers as part of their "accession point training." The functions of such a manual, which was termed a "policy factbook," were that it would provide instructors and officer trainees access to

the history of race relations in the Navy, provide information on the origins of the current equal opportunity and race relations programs, and provide information on the requirements and responsibilities of junior officers in these areas under existing regulations. The factbook would also make available a methodology for the translation of these requirements into practical courses of action within the types of work settings officers would encounter in their initial tour of duty.

The creation of a "policy factbook" is equivalent to the construction of a data base of textual information in a given area. The data base for a policy study such as we undertook meant the capture of textual information on the original intent of a given policy; the capture of directives, memoranda, or other sources, which formalized the policy; and the capture of still other information that clarified the actual policy compliance specifications for Navy subordinates who were occasionally ordered by their superiors to simply "maintain a climate of equal opportunity" in their work settings. The establishment of this textual data base was an important development of the authors' participation in the project. A data base of textual information on policy such as was created in our factbook can be used as a management tool in a variety of institutional settings, for in a policy factbook's generic form it can be designed to provide subordinates in any large-scale organization with resources to understand both the intent or "spirit" of a given policy and the requirements or "letter" of such policy.

The specific research findings and insights that guided the design of the policy factbook and provided its theoretical base, however, have hitherto not been presented, and this paper is an

attempt to summarize and share these findings. In brief, we found that the Navy, when faced with the need to address issues of racial discrimination subsequent to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 -- and jolted both by the appointment of the liberal and activist Admiral Elmo Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1970, together with numerous well publicized racial incidents in 1972 -- generated a series of three distinctly different programmatic interventions to lower the frequency of racial incidents and to address patterns of racial and ethnic discrimination. We found that these programs could be identified as growing out of central (but implicit) theories of racial and ethnic discrimination. Each of these theories attributed the source of this problem to different agents and agencies and consequently designated other agents and agencies as responsible for its solution. We shall use the terms attribution theories and attribution models rather than causal models as descriptive of these theoretical constructs to indicate that that Navy policy makers were not generating empirically testable predictive models, but rather casting about both for definitions of "the problem" of discrimination as well as for the identification of possible sources of discrimination that could be addressed without "disrupting" the pursuit of the Navy's "primary mission."

Broadly speaking, the first attribution model employed attributed discriminatory practice not to sources of bias embedded in organizational procedures but to the prejudiced attitudes of individuals acting in discriminatory fashion; specifically, white "racists" discriminating against blacks. This analysis of the situation, apparently spurred by racial upheavals, led to a Navy-wide intervention, which consisted of programs of education and "racial

awareness" seminars, collectively termed "Phase I," whose intent was to provide individuals with corrective information and which was especially aimed at an outcome that might be referred to as "overcoming white stereotypes of blacks." The expectation of program designers was that this educational experience would lead to a diminution of prejudiced attitudes. An implicit proposition was that, since behavior derived from attitudes, discrimination would diminish and racial incidents would decrease as attitudes were corrected. The designed program thus became a test of this proposition within the context of the organization

The attribution theory that suceeded this conception of discrimination as resident solely in the attitudes of prejudiced individuals was broader in its perception of the causes of discrimination against blacks. In brief, this second model derived from a wider base of information about the causes of black discontent, made accessible through ventilation of these views during "Phase I." In "Phase II," the programmatic consequence of this second attribution model, black complaints were more accurately interpreted as directed at a wide variety of Navy practices perceived as discriminatory, as well as discontent with individuals acting in a discriminatory manner. The validity of this procedural critique was subsequently given some credence by key policy makers with the Navy. In short, bias was seen to have institutional as well as personal sources. Stemming from this analysis of discrimination as at least partly resident in organizational procedures, a combination of partial institutional reform and an array of new "add on" programs was devised to address institutional sources of bias in recruitment, performance evaluation, testing, promotion, and military justice. It was principally within

this Phase II effort that the authors began to study the problem, to perform the research, and to design the course.

Toward the end of our involvement, the Navy embarked on "Phase III," a program which had yet a third implicit attribution model at its core. This third conception of the sources of racial discrimination saw the problem this time as due primarily to the failure of middle management techniques, and middle management commitment. This analysis, which partakes of both attitudinal and procedural components, led to a program of management training that equated good leadership with the promotion of a climate of equal opportunity within the work group, division, or command for which an officer is responsible.

We shall now provide one explanation of how and why these three attribution models of discrimination, held by policy makers within the Navy, altered over time and how they led to radically different programs of training and institutional change. We shall also attempt an assessment of the empirical status, or coordination to reality, of each of these models and the efficacy of the programs that embodied them. At the outset, however, a definition of terms commonly used in discussions of discrimination and racism may be useful.

2. Definition of Terms.

In this discussion, prejudice will refer to an attitude that a person holds, not behavior that he engages in. In the sense we will use the term, it is the prejudgment of members of minority groups in negative terms. It most often takes the form of negative generalizations or stereotypes about the group as a whole. Stereotypes that are extended to individual members of the group without

distinction of their invididual characteristics.

Personal or individual discrimination, in contrast, will refer to the behavior of an individual, not to an attitude he holds. It is the action taken by a person of a majority group against members of a minority group. This discriminatory action, which derives from prejudice, involves the categorical and negative treatment of any member of a minority group solely because he is a member of the negatively perceived group, and thus supposedly embodies all the negative features of that group.

Personal racism is a special case of discrimination, in which a person or persons of one racial group discriminate(s) against members of a different racial group simply because of their race.

Institutional discrimination is the term we use to describe the structure of arrangements or contexts within an organization that, unintentionally or not, are claimed to systematically restrict the opportunities granted, performance attainable, or services offered to the members of a particular minority group. Whereas personal discrimination is a pattern of overt action by an individual against other individuals, institutional discrimination may be overt or covert, and is not readily attributable to individuals. In the case of institutional discrimination, it is basically the policies of the organization itself, its procedures, or its criteria of performance that are the factors that systematically discriminate against individuals of a particular minority group.

Institutional racism will simply refer to the special case of institutional discrimination where organizational policies or procedures deny participation or services to members of a specific racial group.

Throughout the paper, the term discrimination, in both its personal and institutional context, is the general term used to refer to the behavior of which racism is a specific type.

In an essay on racial discrimination, Friedman (1975) further specified four principal types of institutional racism, of which two -- procedural and systemic racism -- may also be seen as forms of discrimination. Since they have particular bearing on the Navy case, further explication of these concepts is useful here.

Procedural discrimination. When individuals act in an unintentionally discriminatory manner in pursuing the established procedures of the institutions and organizations they are members of, the resulting form of institutional discrimination can be termed procedural discrimination.

A simple and familiar example of procedural discrimination is the following: Employees may be required to takes tests for advancement. Such tests are supposed to provide an unbiased estimate of the job related competence of employees in a particular area. But these estimates frequently are influenced by the individual's prior experience at taking tests, or his academic preparation. Thus, it is often the case that employees at the same level of "hands on" ability in the actual operation of machines do not score equally on a given test. In this case, the test provides a biased estimate, since it gauges more than the ability to do a job -- it also estimates strength of academic background or other factors that might be irrelevant to job performance, and simply verifies that some employees have different educational histories from others. When a racial or ethnic group whose members may be competent at job performance, but poor at test taking due to prior educational experience, is consistently

denied promotion or certification solely on the basis of their test results, this becomes a clear case of procedural discrimination.

Systemic discrimination. Institutions and organizations are often guilty of discrimination not simply through their agents and the procedures these employees carry out, but also through their own pattern of interdependence. This form of discrimination rests on the mutually supportive practices of institutions in different sectors of society, and could be termed systemic discrimination. Though perhaps oversimplified, Baron's (1969) discription of interlocking social structures concisely states the impact of this form of discrimination on black ghetto residents:

> The ghetto provides the base for the segregated schools. The inferior education in ghetto schools handicaps the black worker in the labor market. Employment discrimination causes low wages and frequent unemployment. Low incomes limit the market choices of black families in housing. Lack of education, low level occupations, and exclusion from ownership or control of large enterprises inhibit the development of political power. The lack of political power prevents black people from changing basic housing, planning, and educational programs. Each sector strengthens the racial subordination in the rest of the urban institutions. (1)

3. Models of Organizational Response to Discrimination.

With the preceding brief sketches as background, we may further identify a number of components common to the three phenomena of personal discrimination, procedural discrimination, and systemic discrimination. For each we can identify, at least (1) a primary agent or agency responsible for immediate, "first line" acts or patterns of

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1) Harold M. Baron, "The Web of Urban Racism." In Louis L. Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt, eds., Institutional Racism in America. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 160.

discrimination, (2) the rationale by which the discriminatory action is legitimated by the agent or agency, (3) its method of operation, (4) the consequences of the action for the individuals discriminated against, and (5) the class of people for whom a claim of discrimination is made (by themselves or others). These common dimensions of discrimination can be thought of as phases in a flow of discriminatory action, proceding temporally from their source in a primary agent or agency through their rationale to their separate methods of operation and the consequences for those affected. In addition, since our aim is to examine discrimination as a problem confronted by policy makers and their response to it, we may add several categories of phases in the flow of discrimination to explicate the full complexity of the problem.

In general, these phases are temporally successive to the consequences for individuals who are being discriminated against. An obvious next phase is the review of the indicators, which are the actual incidents, complaints, or performance anomalies that are different varieties of negative reactions to discrimination manifested by those discriminated against. These are the real world data, which bring to the attention of policy makers the existence of "a problem" that may subsequently be identified by policy makers as discrimination. There are further the policy makers' interpretations of the indicators as signalling discrimination of one of our three types, a combination of these, or as indicative of other types not treated in this paper (such as cultural or ideological discrimination) or as not indicating discrimination at all. If the interpreters do identify "the problem" as at least partially due to discrimination, and further identify the discrimination as being of a specific type,

then programmatic interventions or changes in the organization's procedure or people may be devised in an attempt to reduce the specific type of discrimination or to optimize other indicators of program success. Following the implementation of these programs, the institutional and personal reactions of people to these programmatic solutions surface as the programs collide with, complement, or bypass peoples' individual belief systems and their organizational role requirements. Figure 1 represents the principal components or phases of the three types of discrimination, and the categories of personal and institutional response to these programmatic changes made by the organization.

Insert Figure 1 here.

For policy makers themselves, and for those who design programs to remediate or at least ameliorate discrimination at the behest of policy makers, the task of correctly interpreting the complaints as arising from one or another type of discrimination is complex and demanding. Indeed, the interpretation of incidents or performance anomalies as anything other than "personality clashes," "resistance," or other individually rooted idiosyncratic behavior may well be difficult for the organization. Similarly, even if discrimination, or racism as a specific form of discrimination, is recognized as a problem by policy makers, then admission that it may have origins in the very procedures of the organization may be difficult to admit for those who have the power to alter these procedures, since they have worked within and benefitted from these same procedures. In this instance, the official recognition of the existence of systemic

procedural discrimination by policy makers implies a degree of self-criticism, since rules by which they have benefitted have been identified as simultaneiously hindering the progress of others. An additional difficulty in the interpretation of the surfacing of discrimination through complaints, incidents, or performance anomalies is that these signals seldom originate from discrimination that is solely of one ideal type, for "on the ground," in society at large and within organizations, typologically pure forms of discrimination are rarely found -- their complexity reflects the complexity of organizations and individuals involved.

Nonetheless, discrimination may be predominantly of one type or another, and it can be formally conceptualized so that it can be detected, and, when located, can be addressed appropriately. In fact, policy makers' failure to be in the right "ball park" in their interpretation of signals and consequently in the programmatic remedies they invent can have important and even explosive consequences, as our Navy examples will demonstrate.

While bearing in mind the real life complexities of problem definition, attribution of the problem to sources, and the design of appropriate intervention strategies within organizations, one can make a case that, perceived from a simple and schematic perspective, there are only three central locales or "ball parks" in which problems can reside and to which interventions can be addressed within organizations; namely, (a) the composition of the incoming population of workers, (b) the procedures of the institution, or (c) the quality and quantity of its products. The trouble shooting function of those who direct organizations is thus to detect and interpret the signals of distress arising from the organization, determine their

connectivity to one or another of these areas, and to intervene with the correct remedial program. Figure 2 shows these three central problem locales and intervention targets schematically. This figure may be thought of as an enlargement of the policy maker's problem analysis and attribution modeling phase in Figure 1, with "other institutions" omitted as not subject to remediation. Since in the Navy the product is not hardware but "performance" we have labeled this point as such.

Insert Figure 2 here.

Parenthetically, this model of problem locales and intervention foci has analogues in control or response surface theory (Johnson, et al., 1979), and in optimal structural design work more generally. These theory and design models comprise a mathematical "metalanguage" that can be used to identify scientifically the central components of structural design experiments, and that permits the codification of scientific knowledge drawn from the results of such experiments. While we do not use this metalanguage in the present study, it does underly some of our analysis, and the abstract formulation of the organizational analysis dimensions presented in Figure 2 derive in part from work by McAdams (1969), which prefigured Johnson's development of a more comprehensive metalanguage. In McAdams's formulation, a scientific inquiry is a condition in which an operation is performed upon an object, yielding knowledge about the properties of the object under the condition of the operation. In the organizational context of our research, we dealt with the "objects" that were analogous to the population that entered the Navy, the

"operations" having their analogues in the roles these personnel filled and the procedures they followed in the performance of these roles. The "properties" of our research context may be seen as analogous to the level of performance that the conjunction of people and jobs were able to achieve. Codification of our research results occured when classes of persons, performances, or procedures could be isolated and relational linkages made between these classes.

To return to Figure 2, our claim is simply that, for example, if a group of senior officers in the Navy are faced with lowered performance as a problem, they have three principal areas in which to locate the primary and immediate sources of the problem, and, consequently, three primary areas in which to focus remedial intervention programs. The officers may determine that the roots of this problem lie with the characteristics of the personnel coming into the Navy, and attempt to restrict entry to "qualified" personnel. Or, they may see the problem as principally resident in procedural factors, which they may attempt to alter, or in inflated performance standards, for which they can lower performance criteria. Obviously, a combination of any of these diagnoses and interventions is also possible, but if gross misdiagnosis of the primary source of the problem occurs at this simple level, and gross misapplication of remedial action ensues, such as diagnosiing personally based problems as arising from procedural sources of bias, or vice versa, the damage to the institution can be considerable.

Similarly, of one of these basic areas is not permitted to vary by policy makers, then it is fruitless to insist that the problem and its remediation lie in this area. Rather, the "problem" logically must be defined as located in another one of the principal problem locales,

and addressed within that other area. In the Navy's case, the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in mid-1973 severely limited the institution's choice of incoming personnel, while its performance standards, as determined by the cybernetic demands of sophisticated technology, also remained rather inflexible. Thus, with these two classes not free to vary, the procedural features of a tradition based institution -- the "rocks and shoals," "rules and regs," and "chain of command" -- became the only logically identifiable sources for any problems in discrimination. Our aim in the remainder of the paper will be first to go directly to a chronological account of the Navy case as we became familiar with it, and to comment on it as illustrative of the pitfalls inherent in the interpretation of problem indicators, the construction of attributional models by policy makers, the design of programmatic interventions, and the consequences of failure to accurately determine the correct problem and program locales.

4. Programmatic Consequences of Causal Modeling of Discrimination: The Navy Example.

A. Introduction.

The history of black Americans and other racial minorities in the United States Navy shows an overall pattern of early participation followed by a policy of segregation and then desegregation. Desegregation, in the post-Korea period, may be said to have led to a degree of integration, at least in the enlisted ranks. As of 1974, the Navy counted 64,485 minority members, consitituting 2 per cent of the officer corps and 13 per cent of the enlisted ranks.

The policies of the past were characterized by allowing racial

minorities little participation in peacetime, recruiting them in time of war as manpower needs increased, and returning them to restrictive policies at the end of hostilities. In the case of blacks, policy was often based on a disbelief in black abilities, a related fear that black success in combat would encourage demands for equality in civilian society, and a sense that if discrimination was the pattern of civilian society, it was not the Navy's duty to correct it. The manpower demands of the Second World War, however, largely overcame some of these doubts, and in that war and the subsequent conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the opportunities available in the military caused blacks and other minorities to enlist in great numbers. Once minorities were admitted in strength, the repeated evidence of minority capabilities forced a reappraisal of restrictive policies, and this reappraisal, together with a variety of court decisions, led to the current degree of black participation in what has traditionally been the country's "whitest" service.

From the standpoint of black servicemen, their perceptions of the military as a whole have undergone changes that reflect of the extent of their participation in the military. When blacks were "fighting for the right to fight" during World Wars I and II, their demand was to be treated exactly the same as whites, and their concern was that the Navy should recruit, train, assign, and promote personnel without regard to race. Legal actions brought by the NAACP at the outset of World War II with the aim of exapanding the draft to include blacks and of pressuring exclusively white military branches such as the Marines to recruit blacks were pursued partly for the symbolic importance of military service. As Janowitz (1975) states,

> In a fundamental sense, to be armed was thought to be fully accepted, to become an equal member of

society, since military service was taken to be an essential sign of complete citizenship. (2)

Though the white military establishment had long resisted desegregation of the military, the attitude changed to acceptance during the Korean conflict and subsequently. Indeed, as the military became more integrated, the official position of the military became that of the early black leaders, namely, as was said in the Army, "we have only one color -- olive drab."

Paradoxically, however, the Vietnam conflict marked a definite turning point in the attitudes of blacks toward the military. At the outset of the war, the traditional attitude prevailed. Although blacks were well aware of continuing problems of discrimination in the military, the armed forces were still one of the least segregated avenues of opportunity for blacks.

Military service provided some financial security and the opportunity to receiving training in skills. In addition, there was a sentiment that the uniform gave "prestige and status to a guy who has been 100 years on the back burner," and that, "prestige ... combat units enable the young Negro soldier to prove to himself and ... to others that he is a man among men"(3). These factors, plus the extra pay for combat service, helped account for fact in the early phases of the conflict blacks tended to volunteer for front-line combat duty and other hazardous assignments at a higher rate than whites, and made up more than 25 per cent of high-risk Marine line companies.

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2) Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict: Easays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 276.
3) Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 204.

But, later in the war, black personnel began to reflect changes in the attitudes of their communities back in the civilian society. Some felt that the military could no longer give black youth better opportunities than they could expect in civilian life. There was also the feeling, as one black leader expressed it, that,

> We are taking the the young black men who have been crippled by our society and sending them 8,000 miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Aisa which they have not found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem. (4)

There was a growing sense that the proper interests of blacks lay in combatting discrimination at home. The protest movements of the late sixties also gave rise to a new black consciousness and racial pride. The influx of blacks who held these attitudes into the military brought about a reversal of attitudes, which is aptly described by Foner (1974) as follows:

> Traditionally, blacks had demanded complete equality of treatment within the armed forces -- a demand which had been equated with the idea that blacks should be treated exactly the same as whites. Now, just as this demand seemed close to fulfillment, black servicemen were demanding an official recognition of their distinctive lifestyle and culture. But as always, ... they were simply reflecting changes in the large black community and its consciousness. (5)

By the early 1970s, there were complaints about discriminatory double standards in assignments, promotions, and especially punishments, where it was charged that, "commanding officers, unable to cope with black demands for equality of opportunity, had turned increasingly to punitive measures." When disturbances with racial

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4) Ibid., p. 206.
5) Ibid., p. 207.

overtones took place, it was said only blacks were punished. Racial incidents became more frequent as racial difficulties increased in the civilian society and carried over to the military.

The Vietnam conflict is often seen as the most racially integrated war in American history, and by the late sixties the military had become, and continues to be, the most recially integrated institution in American life. Thus, while minorities began to voice complaints of discrimination during the Vietnam era, this phenomenon had its positive side.

In terms of the changing nature of minority group concerns, the attitudes of minority populations naturally were different toward a Navy that excluded them and thus participated in the cycle of systemic discrimination with civilian institutions than they were toward a Navy that was, and is, trying to recruit them and to open opportunities for them. The focus of concern has naturally shifted as the policy of the institution itself has shifted. As the policy of exclusion has changed to one of inclusion, criticism of exclusiveness has changed to a concern over the internal policies of the Navy. In effect, complaints of systemic discrimination have given way to complaints of procedural discrimination. This latter concern has a positive side to it, in that it is an indication of increased utilization of black personnel and the attempt to provide equality of opportunity. Blacks segregated in their own units, or excluded from the Navy altogether, were never able to experience the racial double standards of procedure, let alone complain about them. In this sense, the objections of black personnel about performance rating procedures are positive signs of black participation, and are indications of the kinds of issues that many institutions of civilian society will have to face as they are legally

required to provide equal opportunity.

B. The Human Goals and Phase I Models.

1.) Introduction.

In response to these changes and the level of minority protest, during 1969 all the services began to take action to deal with the discontent of racial minorities. A first step was Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's creation of an Intensive Task Force of Education in Race Relations in early 1969. Within the Navy, Admiral Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, recommended in March 1970 the establishment of Human Relations Councils for all commands. In November of 1970, a directive from the new CNO, Admiral Zumwalt, solicited volunteers for the Human Mangaement Program. Further directives established Navy race relations and equal opportunity programs and one of Admiral Zumwalt's famous "Z-grams," NAVOP Z-66, directed that Special Assistants for Minority Affairs be appointed for major commands.

The Navy subsequently developed a Human Goals program, designed to support a series of Human Goals directives of the Department of Defense. In addition to programs addressing drug abuse and alcoholism prevention, a major component of the program was its equal opportunity and race relations plan. This developed into what came to be termed "Phase I" of the Navy Equal Opprotunity/Race Relations Program. Phase I had several major concerns:

A) Phase I was to "bring to light inequities in Navy treatment of minority personnel (including women)"
B) It was to "plan programs to deal with the elimination of these inequities"
C) It was to "educate all personnel" as to the "debilitating effects of personal and institutional racism" and discrimination, so as to create a favorable atmosphere in which equal opportunity and race relations programs could be implemented. (6)

Without dwelling on the details of Phase I, we can discuss two major components of it, the Human Relations Councils, and the program of Race Relations Education. In brief, the Human Relations Councils were groups of three or more designated representatives of various racial and ethnic goups in each command, created to advise their commanders or commanding officers. The council members were to serve within the chain of command to "improve internal communication, awareness and understanding of human relations problems and to assist in their resolution"(7). Race Relations Education was the area that was given the highest priority during Phase I. It was originally generated as a way to meet the DoD requirements of 18 hours of race relations education for all current and incoming Navy personnel, but soon took on a life of its own. The program had as its core a series of seminars given at fleet and shore stations: These seminars took the following forms.

A) Flag Officers' Seminars. These were two-day, 20-hour seminars "designed to increase flag officers' understanding of personal and institutional racism." Attendees were expected to "develop, implement, and monitor measures that ensure a Navy climate of equal opportunity consistent with Navy goals of good order, discipline and combat readiness."

B) Executive Seminars. These were three-day, 24-hour seminars for officers and enlisted men in command, executive, and upper management positions. Like the Flag

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6) Rear Admiral C. F. Rauch, Jr., "Phase II Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Sponsor Guidleines." Unpublished and undated internal memorandum, p. 3.

7) Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Human Goals Plan, OPNAVINST 5300.6A (Washington: 13 December 1973).

seminars, Executive seminars were intended to promote understanding of the dynamics of personal and institutional racism, and problem identification. These seminars were usually conducted in groups of up to 25 participants in functionally related commands or units. The aim was to create a knowedge base for the design of command affirmative action plans.

C) UPWARD Seminars. UPWARD was an acronym for Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity. The UPWARD seminars were 2-1/2 day, 20-hour sessions designed to help lower level enlisted personnel become aware of each other's racial "attitudes, presumptions, and prejudices" and to alert personnel to discriminatory practices within commands. These seminars were conducted by Racial Awareness Facilitators (RAFs), who were qualified officers and petty officers selected by commanding officers. The RAFs attended training courses at Human Resource Mangagement Centers, and operated as bi-racial teams within their commands when they returned.

The programmatic interventions outlined above formed the backbone of the program of Phase I race relations education for fleet and shore stations. On 10 August 1973, the CNO approved the goal of training 70 per cent of the Navy personnel in pay grades E-5 and above by 30 March 1974, and completing Phase I awareness training for all personnel on or about 1 July 1974. The Flag Officers' Seminars began on 22 November 1972, and, by July 1973, virtually all flag officers had participated. Executive and UPWARD seminars had provided awareness training in the group format for 185,000 personnel by October 1973, and for the bulk

of their target personnel by the starting date of Phase II in July 1974.

2.) Interpretation of Events and Attributional Models in Phase I.

In implementing Phase I, the Navy was responding partly to its own perceived needs, and partly to the necessity of meeting the Department of Defense requirement for 18 hours of annual instruction in racial awareness for all personnel. Implicit in the DoD directives which the Navy received was the assumption that problems in race relations were due primarily to racial or ethnic misunderstanding and that the difficulties were attitudinal problems which could be solved by the dissemination of corrective information through a series of seminars.

The Navy's own Race Relations Education Program also subscribed to this perception of the problem and the proposed DoD solution during the early part of Phase I. Although it was stressed that command and individual actions "to eliminate racism from the Navy" were to follow from the educational experiences of UPWARD and Executive seminars, the linkage from the programmatic intervention (more education) to the performance change (lower frequency of racial incidents) assumed that the problem of racism was largely a problem of attitudes. This was in effect a logical proposition that (1) the seminars would change misguided attitudes, and (2) that changed attitudes would lead inevitably into nondiscriminatory behavior.

An excerpt from a Phase I memo to Commanders-in-Chief exemplifies in microcosm the attributional model on which the educational program was based.

> The most subtle seduction in terms of race relations is the whisper that equates "no incidents" with racial harmony. That squeaky wheel mentality in reverse, as shown in recent days, lulls leadership into a sleep from which there is an almost guaranteed rude awakening. Racial awareness must be the goal. The target population for education and racial awareness must be the majority membership at the upper and middle management echelons. No longer can we talk (if we ever could talk) in terms of a black or yellow or brown or red problem. We have a Navy problem to be owned, addressed, and solved by enlightened Navy leadership. BUPERS must share in the guilt for the lack of awareness both individually and systematically. The commitment for the present and certainly for the future is an increasing, developing, enriching awareness through which we shall confront and eliminate every form of racism within our community. (8)

In the small-scale model expressed in this memorandum, data in the form of racial incidents have brought about the recognition of a problem whose source has been attributed to lack of awareness, or, in terms of our model of problem locales illustrated in Figure 2, attitudinal characteristics of the "middle and upper management echelon" population. The programmatic intervention is an exhortation for leadership at these levels for commitment to "increase racial awareness" without specifying what this awareness is or what actions should follow from it.

As the program of race relations education and awareness seminars was implemented throughout the Navy in Phase I, reactions to this intervention strategy came principally from two quarters: the middle management levels of senior enlisted men and junior commissioned officers and the lower levels of the enlisted ranks. The substance of these reactions, in turn, provided Navy policy makers and

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8) Ibid.

us as researchers with clues as to the appropriateness of the link of problem definition, attributional modeling, and intervention strategies that developed from policy makers' recognition that a problem existed.

3.) Reaction of Middle Management to Phase I.

Middle management reaction has been well documented by Cressy and Desfosses (1974), who presented evidence that middle managers resisted for a variety of reasons:

--The programs were "a challenge to (the manager's) concept of leadership and damaging to 'traditional' Navy discipline."

--No system existed to "reward the leadership behavior proposed by the programs."

--"The group process employed ... often involved the normal work group of the participants." Putting managers on an equal footing with lower level enlisted men in this way meant the process "tended to place the regular leaders (middle managers) of the group in unfamiliar and unsettling roles."

--"Some middle managers who are aware of their racial prejudices felt the potential exposure of their attitudes in the group process; some simply resisted having the security of their prejudices disturbed." (9)

4.) Reaction of Enlisted Personnel to Phase I.

For white enlisted personnel, there was often resistance to the format of Phase I UPWARD seminars as handled by some RAFs who tried to get participants in the groups to "own up" to their own prejudice. The

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9) Peter H. Cressy and Louis R. Desfosses, "Developing an Alternative Approach to Race Relations Education: Identifying Military Middle Management Resistance." Naval War College Review, July-August 1974, p. 61.

result was occasionally "a feeling of participant hostility toward race relations education (and) a lack of desire to be part of future race relations efforts." For black enlisted men, the complaints were somewhat different. A frequent objection among minority personnel was not about the seminars themselves, which were perceived as beneficial, but about the lack of programs to act on complaints and issues raised in the course of UPWARD training. This resulted in "a frustration with the inability to channel the need for positive action," which had become apparent during participation in the seminars.

5.) Phase I Analysis and Summary.

As a measure of the Navy's own racial climate and of the nature of middle management and enlisted perceptions of the problems of discrimination, Phase I was valuable as a source of data. In terms of our typology of forms of discrimination and policy maker's responses, it appeared that Navy brass had accepted the data analysis, attribution modeling, and programmatic intervention strategies laid out by the Department of Defense. That is, Navy policy makers accepted the DoD interpretation that racial incidents were indicative solely of black reaction to white attitude of racism which surfaced in personal discrimination against blacks. In short, these policy makers located the main problem source as resident in a population characteristic (white attitudes toward blacks), and with a "can do" spirit set about to implement the DoD requirement of 18 hours of annual "race relations instruction," with the professed aim of altering the consciousness of whites. Since the characteristics of the white population available as recruits for the Navy could not really be altered by the fiat of policy makers, however, and since the deep seated attitudes of whites

within the Navy could not be significantly changed by even 18 hours of racial awareness training, Phase I clearly ran into difficulties.

To sum up, the problems of the Phase I racial awareness program may have been due in part to its basis in what Raab and Lipset (1971) term "the 'attitudes first' falacy, which holds that prejudice is a lurking state of mind that spills over into overt behavior," whereas in reality "behavior typically shapes and alters attitudes" (10).

But difficulties also arose because Navy policy makers compounded the problem by focusing on population characteristics as the problem source and by attempting to change these personal and individually rooted characteristics over which program designers could exert little real control.

Yet another problem lay in the procedural life of the institution. The nature of middle management and enlisted reaction to Phase I surfacced partly as cultural clashes that arose in the seminars and subsequently. But there were also repeated references to Navy organizational procedures, which identified this area as a central problem locale and as the target to which remedial interventions should be addressed. In the course of awareness seminars, for example, blacks' complaints did dwell to some extent on the need for white attitude change, but also mentioned procedural issues. Among these were promotion procedures, which appeared to be biased or had not been adequately explained; pencil and paper, rather than "hands on" performance rating criteria; the bureaucratic and incomprehensible nature of grievance procedures; and military justice. Moreover, both middle managers and blacks complained that the attitude change

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10) Earl Raab and S. M. Lipset, "The Prejudiced Society." In G. T. Marx, ed., Racial Conflict. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 38.

programs were not supported by complementary changes in institutional procedures. For black enlisted personnel, frustration arose because there was no provision for issues covered in awareness seminars to be acted upon. For the predominantly white middle management community, there was no identifiable reward structure for altering "proven," but possibly discriminatory, leadership behavior.

C. The Hicks and Luckett Reports.

In the midst of Phase I, a variety of racial incidents occurred on the Navy carriers Constellation and Kitty Hawk, on the oiler Hassayampa, and on Marine bases in the West Pacific. By mid-1973, two reports had been compiled that addressed these occurrences, and that had considerable influence on the Navy's formulation of Phase II of its equal opportunity and race relations effort. The report dealing with the Marine base disturbances became known as the Luckett Report, after its author, J. R. Luckett, while the Hicks report was the report of a special House Armed Services Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy, chaired by Floyd V. Hicks, and dwelt on the shipboard incidents.

1.) The Luckett Report.

There is no space here to elaborate on the complex history of the various incidents covered by both reports. The Luckett Report formulated a "predictive model" of "internal uprisings." This model postulated four stages racial incidents typically passed through; the Precedent Phase, the Escalation of Tensions Phase, the Catalytic Phase, and the Turbulence Phase. To take only the Precedent Phase, Luckett identified some twenty components, of which the following were key:

Existence of black organizations

Concentration of blacks in units

Voluntary de facto segregation

Outward black unity

Ineffective human relations programs

In Luckett's view, the existence of black organizations "provided a set of alternative values often counter to those of the command structure" (11). The concentration of blacks in units due to uniformly poor test scores was held to "facilitate internal communication and formulation of the (black organization) infrastructure" (12). One result was voluntary de facto segregation, where "blatant, induced segregation on the part of blacks" occurred in mess halls on base and bars off base (13). Black unity became a set social pattern and, thus, according to Luckett, a basic catalyst to racial violence. The solution proposed by Luckett was enforced black disunity, or racial integration, to be accomplished by the dispersal of blacks in a wide spectrum of different ranks.

Despite his rather odd characterization of the symptoms of the precedent phase of racial unrest, which hardly indicates a culturally pluralistic view of the Marine Corps, Luckett attended strictly to organizational procedures as the main source of problem in his attribution model, and as the proper target for remedial intervention strategies. He stressed his belief that Marine recruiting would

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11) U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy, Ninety-second Congress, second session. Printed October 1974 as HASC 93-13, p. 180.
12) Ibid., p. 181.
13) Ibid.

continue to take in a significant proported of poorly education young blacks, but also emphasized that performance standards were "not negotiable." He thus ruled out the possibility that population characteristics or performance criteria could be considered as problem locales, and thus excluded the design of intervention programs addressed to these areas.

Instead, Luckett recognized that a basic reason for the concentration of blacks in low skill billets, which required minimal prior education or training, was that they had scored low on the AFQT and other tests at the end of basic training, and as a result had not been assigned to "A" schools where skills could be learned and from which promotion would normally follow. Given that such unskilled personnel, victims of prior systemic discrimination in economic and educational systems, would continue to enter the Corps, the report suggested that some ways of compensating for this fact should be devised if blacks were to be promoted and assigned throughout the command structure, since the present testing and assignment system was "thoroughly white, middle class oriented." Luckett suggested that "the criteria and means for assignment to MOSs be reviewed to provide a system that does not load certain MOSs. The corollary to this is assignment and billeting policies down to the lowest unit that will ensure integration rather than racial segregation"(14). For example, one method of compensating for low test scores suggested by Luckett was to place more emphasis on actual job mastery and less on test results when black candidates were considered for promotion, if this could be done without compromising performance.

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14) Ibid., p. 186.

The Luckett Report also recommended strengthening of the role of human relations personnel in commands as ombudsmen between minority enlisted personnel and the upper echelons of commands.

In sum, the Luckett Report saw the concentration of black personnel as being at the root of racial problems, attributed this concentration to procedural factors, and recommended dispersal of these groupings as part of the solution. Dispersal would be accomplished by instituting new procedures in the form of criteria of assignment and promotion. Auxiliary human relations personnel would also be used to facilitate communication between minority and majority personnel.

2.) The Hicks Report.

The Hicks Report identified three rather different causes of the racial incidents it reviewed. Although "members of the subcommittee were unable to find institutional discrimination," they did identify the problems of lax discipline, or "permissiveness," demoralization of "middle management" personnel, and improper recruiting tactics.

According to the report, demoralization of middle management and consequent permissiveness was partly fostered by the "intrusion" of Human Relations councils, which, the report claimed, also appeared to circumvent the established chain of command. It was the subcommittee's opinion that,

> When a seaman can go to some "special interest group" outside the chain of command to discuss his specific grievance without first attempting to resolve his problem through his immediate superior, and, in turn, when someone on that council ... attempts to mediate that problem with the seaman's supervisor, then the authority of that supervisor is inevitably diluted.... (15)

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15) U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Report by the

In response, the subcommittee strongly maintained that "the equal opportunity programs of the Navy must not ... dilute the authority of the chain of command."

The committee also took exception to what it saw as the excessive promises of recruiters to undereducated prospective recruits. It felt that much of the dissatisfaction voiced by protesters (if not their method of protest) was justified in that they had been promised more at the recruiting station than the situation in the fleet allowed the Navy to deliver. The committee noted the difficult

> .. lot of the average sailor in the lower mental group (Group IV) who was not school qualified and was ordered directly from recruit training to the fleet.
>
> His initial shock comes with immediate full-time assignment to mess cooking .... for three months, and then more than likely to ship's maintenance work that seems to offer little chance for advancement, dampens his recruit oriented enthusiasm, and puts the lie to recruiting posters and other similar advertising. (16)

The committee's statement on this issue was that "there is a need for more direct indoctrination on routine shipboard procedures in recruit training to blunt the impact of the early drudgery" (17).

The direction of the Hicks Report was thus similar to that of the Luckett Report, in that it dismissed the possibility that problems arose in, or could be remediated by, attention to entry population characteristics or performance criteria. With the exception of recommending that recruiters be more realistic; however, it advocated

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Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. Navy, Ninety-second Congress, second session. 2 January 1973 (HASC 92-81), p. 17690.
16) Ibid.
17) Ibid.

no novel procedures, only the removal of Phase I Human Relations councils and other personnel and a return to traditional discipline and reliance on "the chain of command."

D. Phase II.

Phase II of the Navy's Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Program, which extended from mid-1974 to mid-1977, reflected in its design some of the experience gained from Phase I as well as attention to recommendations of the Hicks and Luckett reports. Unlike Phase I, whose content was often simply exhortatory, however, Phase II regulations and procedures for programs were spelled out in the Navy's Equal Opportunity Manual, published in May 1974 as an instruction from the Chief of Naval Operations, and which thus constituted a direct order to all ships and stations. This manual not only contained the objectives of the program, but it also spelled out clearly the equal opportunity requirements that all commands and personnel were expected to meet in a wide variety of areas, such as housing, performance criteria, military justice, duty assignments, and many others. Additionally, Phase II required "individual and organizational actions to support the provisions of the Equal Opportunity Manual" and provided programmatic assistance as well as monitoring to insure compliance.

Though Phase II contained a bewildering variety of programs and "action plans," we may focus on two main goals of the effort:

--the integration of Human Resource personnel and programs into the "chain of command," and

--the identification of program success as the responsibility of upper level management.

1.) Integration of Programs into the Chain of Command.

This direction of Phase II was an attempt to forestall further criticism, such as that levelled by the Hicks Report, that Human Relations councils, and Human Relations personnel such as ombudsmen were "circumventing the chain of command." The efforts to integrate the duties of these personnel in Phase I into the command structure in Phase II may be partly characterized as an attempt to involve middle management by requirement. The attendance of this level of personnel was required at workshops with lengthy titles, such as the "Middle Management Equal Opportunity/Actions to Counter Racism Workshop," and these personnel were also required to assist in the design of Affirmative Action Plans for their commands. Even more importantly, performance evaluation forms for this level of commissioned and noncommissioned officers were revised to include items that were clearly aimed at gauging the extent to which minority members of work groups and divisions were being encouraged in their career development.

Another aspect of Phase II's attempt to bring the EO/RR program into the established chain of command was its approach to the enlisted population.

During Phase I, direct feedback from the fleet as well as the findings of the Hicks committee emphasized recruits' lack of information as a prime factor in generating disillusionment among minority enlisted personnel and discontent with their actual Navy experience. Phase II attempted to rectify this situation by its emphasis on what was termed the "rights and responsibilities" of the Navy recruits and all personnel in paygrades E-1 to E-4. The intent of this emphasis was not to warn recruits of the "drudgery" that awaited

them in their fleet assignments, but to inform enlisted personnel what they could expect from the Navy and what the Navy expected of them. The aim of Phase II in this area was to fully inform recruits and E-1 to E-4 personnel of the steps required for advancement. An additional objective was to alert these personnel to their avenues of recourse in the case of grievances, and the conventional procedures to be used in presenting their point of view.

This last point was particularly important, as it reflected the Phase II realization that, since minority personnel had often been excluded from bureaucratic institutions in civilian society, they frequently lacked the experience and understanding of how to solve problems "through the proper channels." The rights and responsibilities emphasis of Phase II attempted to change this by trying to make enlisted personnel aware of how to use the "system," by informing them of EO/RR provisions, and showing them how to use the procedures of the chain of command to secure their rights, without resorting to Human Relations personnel outside the chain of command.

2.) Upper Echelon Responsibility.

Although a great deal of attention and rhetoric was directed toward getting middle management to accept and implement the programs, it was clear that the real intent of Phase II was to make commanding officers responsible for the successful implementation of its features within their units. This goal was commonly termed "command ownership" of the program. The resources made available for such "ownership" were many and varied. To cite only one example, each command was scheduled to be visited by Human Resources personnel who conducted a thorough survey of the command, and then used these data to help the commanding officer to develop a required annaul Affirmative Action Plan (AAP).

The guidelines and worshops that supported the development of these AAPs made plain that their central focus was on minority career development, or in the language of the Equal Opportunity Manual,

> to insure that each person in the Navy has true opportunity to rise to as high a level of responsbility as possible, dependent only on the individual's talent and diligence. (18)

Commanding officers were to monitor the program of minority group members by use of bar graphs called Equal Opportunity Quality Indicators (EOQIs), which had to be maintained and updated semi-annually on a commandwide basis. These graphs were to be used to track, by racial categories, the extent of enlisted use of career counseling, on-board training courses, participation in apprenticeship programs and the like. Finally, the compliance of the commanding officer was secured by making the inspection and approval of the command Affirmative Action Plan a "special interest item" on command inspections.

3.) Phase II Analysis and Summary.

The Phase II effort did incorporate the Hicks recommendation that more attention be paid to the established chain of command, but it did so by trying to require that the chain of command adopt a host of new procedures and adapt some existing procedures, rather than simply allowing the command system to revert to the status quo ante as advocated by the Hicks committee. The Luckett advocacy of minority ombudsmen was ignored, but some provisions were made to lower reading levels of training manuals, to emphasize practical skills in

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18) Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Equal Opportunity Manual, OPNAVINST 5354.1 (Washington: 29 May 1974), p. 2.

performance assessment, and to attend to the career mobility of blacks as advocated in thg Marine Corps report. Finally, the policy makers took the bold step of laying the responsbility for the success of procedural changes squarely at the doorstep of senior officers in charge.

The outset of Phase II did coincide with a modest attempt to tighten recruiting standards, and thus to alter the characteristics of the incoming population. The program also did begin to emphasize "hands on" performance rather than test-taking skills in job mastery evaluations, which could be construed as an attempt to change performance criteria. But the basic thrust of policy makers was to focus on Navy procedures, to impose new practices, to alter some existing procedures, and to identify other procedures as consistent with the aims of the program. Additionally, the program designers attempted to add power to these interventions by (a) spelling out the regulations involved and (b) making upper level management responsible for carrying out the policies.

In terms of our previous models of the attribution of discrimination sources, the evidence clearly suggests that policy makers no longer saw the sources of discrimination to lie solely or even principally in the racist preconceptions of enlisted personnel.

Instead, the sources of discrimination against minority personnel were seen to lie primarily in the area of institutional procedures. To its credit, the Navy did attempt, on a limited scale, to alter some of its procedures directly. The attempt to recast some performance assessment and promotion examinations in a more practical mode is an example of this aspect of Phase II. The bulk of the Phase II intervention strageties were not oriented to the revision of existing

procedures. However, the central intervention strategies of Phase II appeared to be (1) the creation of new programs to be added to the existing responsibilities of commands, and (2) attempts to link the values of the program with traditional Navy leadership values, such as getting the best performance out of one's men. The publication of additional regulations for commanding officers in the Equal Opportunity Manual, and the requirement for commands to design Affirmative Action Plans and maintain Equal Opportunity Indicators are examples of procedures that commands were required to add to their existing duties. The statement by Admiral Zumwalt that "current racial incidents ... are clearly due to failure of commands to implement those (EO/RR) programs with a while heart," and his assertion that Phase II "...is not a push to the far edge of the untried ... (but) a return to our oldest and most proven tradition,... command by leadership" are examples of the Phase iI emphasis on the consistency of additional requirements with traditional Navy leadership norms, and the hope that realization of this linkage would generate support and enthusiasm for the programs.

In terms of the models of problem source attribution and the design of programmatic interventions introduced earlier, Phase II strategies clearly leave something to be desired. In the analysis phase of problem source attribution, Navy policy makers appear to have proceeded logically. With only very limited variance permitted in performance criteria or in characteristics of the entering population, the remedial programmatic intervential correctly focused on procedural sources of discrimination. This focus was sharpened by feedback from Phase I and the Luckett report, both of which had provided evidence of bias in Navy procedures. In the main, however, the devised Phase II

intervention strategies were not geared to alterations of the existing procedures, but to the addition of new procedures, and exhortations to utilize these and existing procedures more equitably.

To us, these strategies were evidence that the core of institutional procedures would continue unaltered. Thus, procedures that allowed, or even forced, middle and upper management to act in ways that might be discriminatory would persist alongside additional, and probably contradictory, "EO/RR" requirements. From the standpoint of our model of the three central problem sources, the Navy's Phase II program gave us the insight that a policy maker's ability to locate the source of a problem in one of the three problem areas is a necessary, but not sufficient, step in devising an appropriate intervention strategy. If the policy maker determines that problems have their main source in procedures, then change in existing procedures must be addressed, not simply the addition of new "rules and regs" to the problem-producing core of existing procedures.

F. Phase III.

By late 1976, the EO/RR programs of Phase II had become a part of a new program called the Human Resource Management Support System. Thus, the Navy"s "EO/RR" effort may be said to be in Phase III. The race relations focus of Phase I had by this time been considerably de-emphasized, and incorporated into a program of "leadership and management training" in which good race relations and a climate of equal opportunity were emphasized as consistent with the traditional Navy leadership value of getting the best possible performance out of one's subordinates.

In contrast to an earlier era in the Navy's history, where racial integration was thought disruptive and hence discrimination against

minorities was thought necessary for "ship efficiency," the new value is expressed in assertions of the following kind:

> Discrimination in the assignment of general administrative and support duties outside of a specific rating specialty undermines morale and hence unit efficiency and overall effectiveness. (19)

Phase III appears to be a deliberate effort to regularize and make routine the aims of equal opportunity and sound race relations originally announced as ideals in Phase I. In Phase III, this apparently means an increased emphasis on persons and personal attitudes, this time with middle management being the focus. Leadership trainingfor this group emphasizes sensitivity in dealing with minority concerns and on middle management responsibility for the successful integration of minority personnel into the Navy's career system. The attempt to routinize equal opportunity and sound race relations in ths way, however, also apparently de-emphasizes the responsiblitiy of upper echelon management, and we may surmise that commanding officers' reactions to the demands placed on them during Phase II may be partially responsible for this shift in the focus of responsibility.

In terms of our models of the attribution of discrimination sources, in Phase III the central problem locale superficially remains organizational procedure, which is further narrowed to the procedures of middle management leadership. Leadership is, however, a rather vague concept. The emphasis on the congruency of nondiscriminatory leadership with traditional Navy leadership values such as "know your men" is logical in the context of a tradition bound organization such

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19) Ibid., p. 1.8.

as the Navy, which relies heavily on references to its heritage and history in recruiting and maintenance of esprit de corps within the organization. Such institutions frequently seek to legitimate change in practice by reference to the congruency of new procedures with an historically consistent underlying value system. The heavy emphasis on leadership values in the current Navy program, however, is once again an emphasis on attitudes rather than behavior, and, as in Phase I, apparently seeks a shift in attitudinal perspective as a population characteristic, a characteristic which has been demonstrated as resistant to change and difficult to monitor. It may be that this signals a (possibly unconscious) shift in policy makers' attribution of the sources of discrimination to a perception of them as resident in the attitudes of middle managers. If this is the case, we may predict resistance of the type evident in Phase I.

5. Conclusions.

This paper is an attempt to formulate models of how several types of discrimination progress through common phases, and how institutions respond to these types of discrimination when they surface, or are detected as problems. Phases of organizationaal response have also been identified, with a critical phase being that of policy makers' attribution modeling of the sources of discrimination and the programmatic interventions that ensue if sources are attributed as residing in persons, procedures, or performance.

Our discussion of the Navy example endeavored to illustrate in an actual institutional context how the data of racial incidents were interpreted by senior policy makers as indicating discrimination resident in the individual attitudes of white personnel, how attitude

change programs were designed on the basis of this model, and what problems arose as a consequence of such modeling when institutional discrimination, embedded in Navy procedures, was in fact the primary source of the problem. The altered attribution modeling of Navy policy makers and consequent shifts in the design of programmatic intervention were then examined in Phase II, in which policy makers attributed the source of discrimination to institutional procedures, but generated new programs rather than altering existing procedures. Finally, we examined Phase III, which attributes discrimination in part to middle management leadership values. We concluded by speculating that Phase III, whose programmatic intervention strategy is in middle management leadership training, may have at its core an attitude change program that may once again bypass the real issue of procedural reform .

This study of the Navy has offered us insight into a model of the three main problem locales of population characteristics, organizational procedures, and performance criteria, which can be targets for intervention strategies in any organizations. Our research indicated that if policy makers attribute problem sources to any one of the three locales, within which no change is possible on the part of the institution, then a likely consequence is the generation of inappropriate intervention programs, inappropriate because they can produce no change.

Figure 1: A Typology of Forms of Discrimination and Policy Makers' Responses.

TIME →

FORM	AGENT OR AGENCY	AGENT'S RATIONALE	AGENT'S METHOD OF DISCRIMINATION	CONSEQUENCES FOR INDIVIDUALS	DATA REACTIONS/ INCIDENTS	POLICY-MAKERS' ATTRIBUTION MODELING	REMEDIAL PROGRAMMATIC INTERVENTIONS	TYPICAL REACTIONS TO INTERVENTIONS
1. Personal Discrimination	prejudiced individuals	all group members partake of negative group characteristics	an individual's exclusion or harassment of other individuals or groups	exclusion, harassment	hostile verbal or physical interaction, complaints of harassment	*analysis of "problem" as principally due to:* a) characteristics of individuals or groups b) procedures of organizations c) performance criteria d) other institutions	*if analysis attributes "problem" to* (a): personal characteristics, an attitude change program ensues.	possible conflict over cultural issues
2. Procedural Discrimination (within one organization)	rules, regulations, institutional procedure, contexts, environments	procedures embody best route to required performance levels	invocation of rules	exclusion, nonrecognition, non-development of capabilities; less "quality of life"	low performance, complaints of discrimination		(b) or (c): a change program revising procedures and/or performance criteria ensues.	possible conflict over "standards," "need to change the system"
3. Syetemic Discrimination (among organizations)	interacting organizations and institutions	entry criteria and procedures institution-specific; given institution "not responsible" for failures of other institutions	exclusion or "tracking" due to entry characteristics of population subsets	exclusion, nonrecognition, non-development of capability, long-term quality of life	complaints of exclusion, low frequency in statistical samples		(d): a change program that directs inclusion of certain groups is installed.	gate-keeping concerns

Figure 2:

Possible Main Sources of Problems

(Problem Locales)

Which Can Be Organizational Targets

For Remedial Intervention Strategies.



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